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15
North Dakota has imposed upon
bility for negligence by special contract.
16
the bailee for hire the duty of ordinary care, and has held that where one
enters into an agreement to return the property or pay its value, he is an in7
The value of the bailed goods is usually a decisive
surer of the property.'
factor in determining the degree of care required of the bailee.18

It is well settled that by actual incorporation into the contract of. the limita9
tion of liability,' the bailee for hire may limit his contract liability unless
20
Hence, the
the limitation contravenes public policy or violates a statute.
limitation in the instant case was perfectly valid in regard to the contract
for storage. However, it seems from the facts in the case that the storage
contract had not become effective when the coat disappeared because the
coat never reached storage. Limitation of liability in bailment contracts usually
2
is strictly construed, 1 and it should be confined to the terms and performance
of the contract.
In the struggle against public policy, limitation of liability has completely
23
Freedom
won out in England,22 but has not fared so well in this country.
of contract should not be hampered unless it actually does operate to the
detriment of the public, but neither should this freedom be extended beyond
the contract. Where the practice of limiting liability would invite fraud, it
should not be allowed to prevail. The wisdom of allowing two parties to
contract to the detriment of a third party, in this case the insurance company,
:is
open to question.
JOHN T. ANDERSON
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It has long been considered settled
law in both federal 1 and state 2 courts that an illegality 3 occurring in the
methods used to bring a defendant back to a state from which he has fled
TURNED TO A STATE FOR PROSECUTION. -

(based
15. Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 11 Okl. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924)
upon statute). But cf. Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 255 Fed. 508 (8th Cir. 1919)
(decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, refusing to apply law established by Oklahoma
decisions).

16. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1504 (1943).
17. Grady v. Schweinler, 16 N.D. 452, 113 N.W. 1031 (1907) (plaintiff's stallion died
while us defendant's possession,); accord, Steele v. Buck, 61 Ill. 343 (Freem. 1881).
18. See Cussen v. Southern California Say. Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 Pae. 1099 (1901).
19. Jones v. Great Northern By. Co.. 68 Mont. 231, 217 Pae. 673 (1923).
20. See Story, Bailments 31-2 (8th ed. 1870).
21. Minnesota B. & C. Co. v. St. Paul C-S. W. Co., 75 Minn. 445, 77 N.W. 977 (1899);
Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68 Mont. 231, 217 Pac. 673 (1923). Contra: Stephens v.
Southern Pae. Ry. Co., 109 Cal. 86, 41 Pac. 783 (1895).
22. See 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 772, 774 (1938).
23. Ibid.
1. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886);
United States v. Toombs, 67 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1933); Ex parte Campbell, 1 F.Supp. 899
(S.D.Tex. 1932). Cf. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944) (by the
same court which decided the principal cases).
2. People v. Groves, 63 Cal.App. 709, 219 Par. 1033 (2d Dist. 1923); Joiner v State,
66 Ga.App. 105, 17 S.E.2d 101 (1st Div. 1941); Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass.
294, 192 N.E. 618 (1934); People v. Eberspacker, 29 N.Y.Supp. 796 (2d Dept. 1894).
3. "Illegality" as used herein refers to acts of abduction or kidnapping, as distinguished
from mere procedural or substantive errors occurring during the course of an extradition
proceeding. For an able discussion of extradition procedures, see Moorhead, Texas and
Interstate Rendition, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 228 (1945).
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in order to avoid arrest and trial in no way impairs the jurisdiction of the
state over him. In view of this state of the law two recent decisions by the,
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should be noticed.
The first decision, in 1949, concerned a defendant who fled from Michigan
to Georgia to escape prosecution. Michigan officers, with the connivance of
local Georgia authorities, returned him to Michigan without going through
extradition procedures. The second case arose in 1951. The defendant was
arrested in Illinois by Michigan officers who returned him for trial, once more
without benefit of extradition proceedings. Both men were convicted. Both
brought petitions for habeas corpus in the federal district court, which denied them in reliance on the old rule. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
both times. In the first case it held that the defendant had been denied due
process of law if the facts as set forth above were established. In the second
decision it held that a kidnapping in violation of federal statutes was set
forth in the petition, and laid it down that a person cannot be kidnapped
from one state and brought to trial in another regardless of the nature of the
crime charged against him. Brown v. Frisbie, 178 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1949)4:
Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951).
The holdings in these two cases are obviously in conflict with the old rule
that the illegality of the acts which bring a defendant within a state's jurisdiction are immaterial to the state's rights to try him. This new rule would
exempt a criminal suspect from trial by a state whose officers had kidnapped
him from another state, at least until he had been brought within the state
by regular methods of extradition from the state of refuge. The idea is not
without historical analogy.5 It has long been the accepted rule that a court
which obtains jurisdiction of a defendant's person under an international
extradition treaty can try that defendant for no offense other than that
specified in the extradition papers. 6 Such treaties, and laws T passed in
pursuance of them, are interpreted as clothing a defendant with immunity
from trial for any other offense committed prior to his extradition until he
has had reasonable opportunity to return to the country from which he was
extradited.8 The basis of this result is to be found in the fact that a sovereign
nation has the right to grant asylum within its borders to fugitives, 9 e.g.
political refugees, if it wishes. To allow a person extradited from a foreign
country to be tried for an offense other than that specified in the extradition
papers would mean an invasion of this sovereign right, since it would be a
simple matter to charge a person wanted for a non-extraditable offense (for
instance, political activity in'opposition to a dictatorial government) with- an
extraditable offense simply to get jurisdiction over him. Of course where the
4. The subsequent bearing in Brown v. Frisbie, supra, resulted in a further denial of

the writ by the district court, which stated that there had been "no violation of federal
statutory and/or constitutional provisions."

Ex parte Brown, 90 F.Supp. 50, 53

(E.D.

Mich. 1950).
5. For an interesting discussion of a similar exception and its advocacy by Clarence
Darrow, see Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense, Ch. 7 (1941). See also Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906).
6. Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); People v. Stout, 81 Hun. 336, 30
N.Y.Supp. 898 (1894).
7. 62 Stat. 825 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §3192 (1948 Supp.).
8. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). For an interesting application of

these principles, see In re Whittington, 34 Cal.App. 344, 167 Pac. 404 (2d Dist. 1917),
commented upon in Moorhead, op cit. supra note 3, at 230, n. 14.

9. United States v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1934).
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extradited person commits a crime after extradition but before opportunity
to return to foreign asylum, the foregoing reasoning applies with materially
reduced force, and it has been held that a trial on the new charge may
be had. 1°
It is clear, therefore, that extradition is a non-judicial political process
designed to promote international and interstate comity." It is based on the
right of a state or nation to territorial integrity and immunity from violation
of that right by officers of other states.'
The courts have therefore said
repeatedly that the right of extradition is not a personal right possessed by a
fugitive from justice but a sovereign right possessed by the state in which he
takes refuge.13 When the question of whether a state was entitled, on habeas
corpus proceedings, to the return of a person abducted from its territory,
arose before the Supreme Court of the United States, however, it was held
that no such right existed and that the state's remedy lay in prosecuting
14
those who had committed the abduction within its borders.
In arriving at the decisions in the instant cases, the Circuit Court neither
provided a mode by which a kidnapped defendant can be returned to his
state of asylum nor intimated that he should be immune from arrest until
given time to leave the prosecuting state. Thus, it seems entirely possible
that the same officers who originally kidnapped him might re-arrest him as
he emerges from his habeas corpus hearing and strip him of his newly won
freedom. While at first glance such a remedy would seem to be one in
form only, the defendant would nevertheless get the practical benefit of a
second trial upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that a kidnapped criminal suspect, after
release on habeas corpus, could claim immunity from arrest until he had
been afforded a reasonable opportunity to return to the state of refuge. 1 5
One considered not within the state's jurisdiction for the purpose of trial
could not consistently be held to be within it for the purpose of arrest.
However, real difficulties could result from allowing a criminal suspect to
claim that he is temporarily not subject to the laws of the state in which
he finds himself.
A significant theoretical question is raised by the Circuit Court's failure to
10. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915); Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909).
11. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412 (1886); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015, 1016 (W.D.Wash. 1924).
12. The extent of sanctity afforded this territorial integrity is well illustrated by the
case of an Indian Hindoo prisoner who escaped from a British ship in the harbor of
Marseilles, France. Although this escapee was on French soil only momentarily before
being returned to the British vessel, the case led to an international dispute requiring arbitration in the International Court of Justice, The Savarkar Case, The Hague Court Reports,

p. 275 (1911).
13. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886); In re Ferrelle, 28 Fed. 878 (S.D. N.Y. 1886).
14. Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 705 (1888). This decision may be criticized on
the ground that it leaves the state of refuge whose rights have been violated with four
separate alternatives: (1) It can forget all about the.case; (2) It can demand the return of the officers guilty of the abduction to its territory for prosecution, a request which
the state harboring the officers is free to refuse; (3) It can attempt to rescue the kidnapped fugitive by sending its own officers over into the state where he has been taken;
or (4) presumably it could in turn kidnap the arresting officers, threatening to prosecute
them in case the kidnapped fugitive is not returned. It goes without saying that a holding
which leaves a state of the union to such warlike alternatives is open to serious question.
"15. See the argument made. for the appellant in Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113,
116 (1909).
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give any :satisfactory explanation of the connection it presumed between the
crime committed by the arresting officers and the right of the state court
to decide the primary question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. It
seems difficult to sustain the result of the present cases on the ground
that the state of Michigan, as distinguished from its officers, was guilty
of any culpable act. A state is not liable for the torts of its agents. 1G Nor
can an officer who commits a crime of the type found in the present case
be considered within the scope, of, his authority.17 The very act denudes
him of official capacity in its commission. 18 Strictly speaking, there can be
no agency, even between individuals, in the perpetration of a crime. 19 An
act criminal in its inception, moreover, cannot be ratified by a purported
principal. 2o Thus the state of Michigan, on settled agency principles, was
not responsible for the acts of its officers. Yet the Circuit Court. in
effect held the state responsible for the kidnapping in the Collins case
by divesting the state courts of jurisdiction.
The dissenting opinion in the Collins case focused attention on the fact
that the Circuit Court, in both the cases under discussion, directed trial of the
habeaus corpus petitions by the federal district court before either defendant
had resorted to the remedies provided by the state courts. It is elementary
that the obligation to enforce and guard rights secured by the federal
Constitution and laws rests as squarely upon state courts as it does upon
federal, and it has been held by the federal courts that persons seeking release
from state custody under habeas corpus proceedings should resort to state
courts before taking recourse to the federal tribunals. 2 1 The federal courts
will therefore hear a petition for habeas corpus by one convicted in a state
court only after all remedies by appeal in that state's courts have been exhausted.22 Exceptions are made only where circumstances of peculiar urgency
justify prompt federal interference. 23 The mere presence of a federal constitutional question dose not justify such interference. 24 The cases which have
allowed exceptions fall into three categories: (1) Those involving intergovernmental relations; 25 (2) those involving failure or inadequacy of the state
appellate remedies; 26 and (3) those involving extreme hardship or emergency

16.
17.
18.
19.

See Prosser, Torts 1064 (1941).
See Mechem, Agency §741 (2d ed. 1914).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Pearce v. Foote, 113 Il1.228 (1885).

20. United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. 72 (U.S. 1869).
21. United States v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925); In re Ryan, 47 F.Supp. 10 (E.D.Pa.

1942).

22. 62 Stat. 967, 28 U.S.C. §2254; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).

23. United States v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925).

24. United States v. Murphy, 108 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1940).
25. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) (state interference with federal officer's
performance of duties); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (state prosecution for killing
done by federal officer in performance of his duty to guard the life of a Supreme Court

justice); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890)

(state prosecution of defendant charged with

perjury in a contested congressional election); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (state
arrest of foreign seaman in violation of federal treaty).
26. Ex parte Stricker, 109 Fed. 145 (C.C.D.Ky. 1901) (state provided no appeal from
contempt ruling); United States v. Ragen, 59 F.Supp. 374 (N.D.III. 1945) (state appeal
frustrated by procedural rule). See Dare v. Burford, 172 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1949)
(stating that such interference is permissible where state remedy is doubtful).
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for the individual defendant involved. 2 7 In the Collins case, the Circuit Court
justified its untimely intervention on the ground that the same district court
had three times upheld the action of the Michigan officers who were
regularly kidnapping criminal suspects for trial. 2 8 This is not the usual
tyie of reason cited by the federal courts to justify untimely intervention in
habeas corpus cases.
Cases involving similar abductions 29 support the Circuit Court's implication
that the arresting officers in the Collins case were guilty of kidnapping under
the Lindbergh Act. 3 0 The Act, since a 1984 amendment, 3 1 has been construed
not to require any element of ransom or reward,3 2 but to make the motive
of the kidnapper immaterial so long as he does the prohibited acts.3 3 In
Gooch v. United States 34 the converse of the present cases was presented. A
criminal, motivated solely by the desire to escape arrest, kidnapped the
officers sent to arrest him and forced them across a state line beyond -de
limits of their authority. A conviction for kidnapping was upheld. It would
seem that the same principles could be consistently applied to convict the
police officers involved in the present cases. The Federal Kidnapping Act
makes no exceptions in favor of over-zealous policemen. 3 5 It is highly
probable that a few convictions for this type of kidnapping would provide a
sufficient deterrent to curb the extra-territorial activities of officious law
enforcement agents.3 6 Indeed, it is submitted that punishment of the
kidnappers and not release of a man whose trial, as distinguished from his
arrest, has undoubtedly been perfectly fair, would be the more expedient
policy to protect the right of personal security against unlawful seizure. That
policy, plus the usual civil remedies for false arrest and imprisonment, should
engender in law officers a reasonable respect for law. It seems unreasonable
that one brought before a state tribunal to answer for a wrong against the
state should be liberated upon a mere showing of a wrong committed by
another. The two are separate transactions and should be dealt with
separately.
Jim R. CARIICAN

27. Potter v. Dowd, 146.F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1944) (petitioner too poor to pursue lengthy
appeal through the state courts); Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F.Supp. 414

(S.D.Ga.

1942)

(life at stake and federal constitutional rights denied); Ex parte Sharp, 33 F.Supp. 464
(D.Kan. 1940) (Mere pretence of trial and denial of chance to appeal to state Supreme
Court). As to the principle of Potter v. Dowd, supra, see United States v. Tyler, 269 U.S.
13 (1925) (taking an opposite view). These rules are definitely discretionary in their
total character, since "unusual hardship" can be pleaded in almost every case where a
person is in prison and contends that he is there unlawfully.
28. See Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464, 468, n.1 (6th Cir. 1951).
29. E.g. United States v. Cleveland, 56 F.Supp. 890 (D.Utah 1944); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
30. 47 Stat. 326 (1932), 18 U.S.C. §1201 (1946). That act made it a federal crime to
transport in interstate or-foreign commerce anyone "unlawfully seized . . . abducted, or
carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise ..
" The words "or otherwise"
were added by amendment in 1934. 48 Stat. 781 (1934). These words broaden the definition of the crime of kidnapping to include cases where the motive of the kidnapper is
any kind or degree of anticipated benefit to himself. Before the addition of these words,
"or otherwise," some element of pecuniary reward or ransom had been considered the sine
qua non of the crime.
31. ]bid.
32. Sanford v. United States, 169 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1948); United States v. Parker,
19 F.Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1937).
33. United States v. Baker, 71 F.Supp. 377 (W.D.Mo. 1947).
34. 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
35. See note 30, supra.

